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The Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has received varying and evolving public health
responses worldwide (1). Sweden remained largely open with health measures aimed most
substantively at vulnerable groups, while South Korea implemented a large testing program,
combined with extensive efforts to isolate infected people and trace/quarantine contacts. The
United Kingdom (UK) considered various approaches before deciding on measures to isolate,
quarantine, and promote social-distancing that were eased in mid-July (1); lockdown is now being
re-implemented with a surging second wave (2). In contrast to early social-distancing measures
in Canada to “flatten the curve,” American states adopted varying approaches, with many states
having now relaxed their measures to differing extents (3). China adopted an aggressive approach
of quarantining the affected Hubei province and isolating infected populations (4). India was under
an ambitious 40-day lockdown, which was then extended until May-31 with districts designated
as red/orange/green based on cumulative cases and doubling rate; red zones continued under
full lockdown whereas orange/green zones had more relaxed measures (5). Gradual easing of
restrictions (“unlock” 1.0 through 5.0) ensued, with lockdown measures nevertheless continuing
in designated containment zones (6). Millions of people around the world still face public health
measures of one form or another, raising the question: how stringent should government responses
be in such pandemics (7), and how long can (or should) such measures continue?
ARGUMENTS FOR STRICT MEASURES
There are clear medical, socio-economic, and humanitarian arguments favoring strict, ongoing
social-distancing or quarantine/lockdown measures, pending a resolution to the pandemic.
Foremost, they may help rapidly halt COVID-19 spread (8). This can prevent healthcare systems
from being overwhelmed, which can be catastrophic even in developed nations, as witnessed in
Italy and Spain (9). In such “sharp curve” scenarios, acute/severe cases exceed hospital capacity
in terms of equipment procurement, staffing, and bed number/acuity, with insufficient time to
build further capacity. Healthcare providers can also be placed at unacceptable risk by community
spread and dwindling personal protective equipment, further crippling the system and driving up
deaths. Furthermore, groups like the elderly or those with disability become especially vulnerable
to exclusionary practices, as utilitarian philosophies – predominant in such crises – unfortunately
discriminate against these patients when allocating scarce resources like ventilators (10). The
proportion in these categories will differ from country to country. For example, 6.2% of the Indian
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population is over 65-years of age vs. 22.8% in Italy; in
contrast, 11.8% live with disability in higher-income countries
vs. 18.0% in lower-/middle-income countries (LMICs) (11). A
blanket lockdownmay also circumvent the challenge of achieving
completeness in case/contact isolation, posed in part by variable
false-negative test results and the substantial prevalence of
asymptomatic cases (12). A blanket lockdown can also be justified
by criteria of economic efficiency, as infected individuals may not
fully internalize the impact of their consumption/work decisions
on viral transmission and may maintain unacceptable levels of
economic interactions (13). This rationale is further supported
if mortality becomes an increasing function of infections due to
healthcare capacity issues (14). It may be economically optimal to
tighten containment measures as the infection rate increases and
relax them as it decreases.
In this regard, Sweden was an outlier in its decision to remain
largely open, with closure of only high-schools/universities whilst
advising isolation by symptomatic individuals and those over
70 (15). Unfortunately, Sweden experienced a higher mortality
rate (about 559 per 1 million) than its Scandinavian neighbors
and most other European nations except Italy, Spain, and the
UK. Swedish intensive care unit (ICU) utilization rates remained
lower than predicted, but this was correlated with more deaths
in non-ICU patients, suggesting that patient prognosis may have
driven ICU admissions, reducing healthcare load but at the cost
of decreased survival in non-admitted patients (15).
ARGUMENTS AGAINST AGGRESSIVE OR
PROLONGED MEASURES
On the other hand, there are equally compelling socio-economic
and humanitarian arguments against aggressive/prolonged
lockdown measures. Social-distancing is a tremendous economic
privilege. To do so successfully, the person must have a home
permitting isolation, whilst being able to obtain supplies without
putting themselves/others at risk – this is not an option for
slumdwellers or homeless individuals. The person should also
be able to work from home or have back-up income. This is far
from reality for daily-wage workers/laborers and small-business
owners who suddenly find themselves without income, as was
the case for roughly 434 million members of the Indian labor
force during lockdown. Particularly in LMICs, governments may
only be able to sustain economic freezing for a few months,
especially if subsidizing wages for those unable to work or laid
off. For example, the Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy
(CMIE) projects that unemployment could spike to over 23%,
with 50 million workers already estimated to lose their jobs
(16). A survey by the non-profit organization Jan Sahas found
that 42% of Indian migrant workers already ran out of rations
half-way into the lockdown, with over 90% lacking any income
(17). Consequently, many migrant workers were forced to
return to their villages, creating further transmission risk. These
challenges prompted the Indian government to intervene with a
basic cash benefit of $40/month with some free food incentives
for the unemployed. Even with such support, we may anticipate
non-virus deaths among impoverished populations lacking
resources to feed/shelter their families. This can be amplified by
failure of preventative healthcare services, as seen with the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, during which deaths attributable to
such failures exceeded those due to Ebola itself (18).
In addition, school closures may deprive socio-economically
disadvantaged children of free meals, disrupt mental health,
and place untenable child-care obligations on struggling families
(19). Other unintended consequences include hospital avoidance
by patients with emergent conditions (20) like heart disease
or stroke, resulting in worse outcomes, and spikes in domestic
violence as victims find themselves cooped up with their abusers
(21). The very same seniors and people with disabilities whom
we seek to protect from COVID-19 can end up worse off from
loss of services and support networks (21). Furthermore, the
longer the lockdown, the higher the number of companies that
must close and the greater the loss of economic infrastructure.
Workers who have accumulated valuable firm-specific skills will
lose their jobs and part of their human capital is irrecoverable.
This destruction of value is what governments are trying to avoid
by providing support to firms to keep workers on their payroll
during lockdown, and by facilitating credit to sustain treasuries of
companies unable to produce (22). Of course, LMICs that cannot
afford subsidizing firms will be unable to maintain part of their
productive capabilities, hampering recovery prospects when this
crisis abates.
THE CHALLENGES OF FINDING A
BALANCED APPROACH
Seeking a compromise, some have advocated an intermediate
approach, dubbed “the hammer and the dance,” where initial
weeks of lockdown-style measures are followed by a period
of relaxed measures allowing return-to-work for most healthy
people, while presumably building healthcare capacity and
increasing testing (23). However, with limited resources, a
dramatic expansion of capacity may be infeasible for most
nations in the short-term. Many lives are still doomed by
“the hammer”; the most socio-economically deprived groups
still will be devastated by weeks of lockdown unless there is
extraordinary financial support, likely unaffordable for many
LMICs. Furthermore, not everyone can “dance”: relaxation of
distancing measures will likely generate a second peak within
a few months, and medically vulnerable populations will again
risk infection, but this time facing pressure to return to
economic productivity.
Indeed, the timing and duration of public health interventions
are just as critical as their stringency. Delays in applying these
interventions and sub-optimal duration can limit their efficacy.
One model suggested that extending measures by 1 month in
Wuhan would delay a resurgence by two additional months;
this may give systems a chance to recoup some resources and
capacity (24). Another model examining India’s initial 21-day
lockdown strategy suggested that a 42–56 day lockdown would
indeed be epidemiologically preferable (25). Yet such decisions
are almost inevitable political minefields; epidemiological models
indicate that the socially optimal lockdown length is always
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longer than the privately optimal length for individuals (26).
The aforementioned Indian model also recognized a tremendous
price to social and economic health with a longer lockdown (25).
In this regard, rather than a sustained uniform national
lockdown, a region-specific approach based on geographic
risk of spread may be a reasonable compromise. For example,
the strictness of travel restrictions and associated penalties
could be higher in areas with high population density (26).
Others have advocated for a demographically-guided strategy,
arguing that most gains of uniform policies may be realized
by having stricter/longer lockdown policies for the oldest
and/or most vulnerable groups alone. Such targeted policies,
combined with measures to reduce between-group interactions,
increased testing and isolation of infected individuals, appear
to minimize economic losses and deaths in some models
(27). Proponents of this approach (encapsulated in “the
Great Barrington Declaration”) argue it will facilitate the
development of “herd immunity” in the lower-risk population,
eventually protecting vulnerable groups (28). However, as
argued by proponents of the “John Snow Memorandum,”
a separation of lower- and higher-risk groups is easier said
than done, and uncontrolled transmission among younger
people again risks substantial morbidity/mortality for the
overall population (29). Furthermore, at present, there is
little evidence for lasting protective immunity following
COVID-19 infection.
Of course, it would be ideal if we could confidently
differentiate between susceptible, infected, and recovered
individuals, as we could fine-tune the intensity of economic
interactions, consumption, and work, for these three groups.
The first group would be more lightly contained, the second
would be in lockdown, and the third would be making up for lost
work as much as possible. To achieve a near-optimal situation,
accurate testing becomes crucial for effective lockdown of
infected individuals. However, testing standards vary worldwide,
and different tests like RT-PCR (reverse transcriptase polymerase
chain reaction) or rapid antigen tests have different false-
positive/false-negative rates. Limited access to testing, lack of
reporting infrastructure, and asymptomatic infections further
complicate the picture, resulting in variable under-reporting
of COVID-19 cases/deaths around the world and limiting
the accuracy of testing/monitoring-based strategies (30). For
instance, a study of testing data from 86 countries estimated
cases and deaths as being 10.5 and 1.47 times official reports,
respectively (31).
Reopening societies before adequate testing and contact
tracing are in place can be catastrophic, as experienced by
American states that led the pack in reopening their economies
in early May. For example, Florida saw a 1,393% jump in daily
cases since reopening and South Carolina experienced a 999%
jump, with health officials estimating that they are still able
to identify only about 14% of cases (32). On the other side
of the world, its economy reeling from the prolonged nation-
wide lockdown, and forcing a gradated approach to reopening,
India is now reckoning with the challenges of a great rise in
COVID-19 cases (currently second-highest in the world) despite
still having similar healthcare capacity limitations as at the start
of the pandemic (33). As policy-makers in India and other
affected countries envision a life of greater economic reopening
beyond the devastating summer/fall of 2020, they will no doubt
seek to draw lessons from the experiences of their American
counterparts about the perils involved.
CONCLUSION
In the first instance, it can be easy to characterize either a
full lockdown or relatively relaxed measures as being bold or
decisive vs. callous or cold-hearted, but on closer examination
it is evident that there are substantial proportions of the
population that will be placed at risk in each case. Indeed, it
can be exceptionally challenging to find strategies to address
the pandemic that do not risk endangering one vulnerable
population or another. Countries are therefore forced to play an
unenviable optimization game of sorts to decide which group
they are willing to “risk,” relatively speaking, and for how long,
and what amount of economic consumption they are willing
to trade off to avoid COVID-19-related deaths. As seen in the
experiences of nations around the word, incentives for one
approach or the other will be country-specific and driven by
economic and demographic factors as well as prevailing cultural
or political philosophies. Regardless of what approach is chosen
in our race to “flatten the curve,” we must take into account the
lives that we risk flattening with it, and do all we can to mitigate
the damage.
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